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Beginning early in its transition to a more market-based economic 
system, Uzbekistan became well known for its heterodox economic 
policies. But since it has insisted on charting its own development path, 
it has incurred a continuous stream of criticisms from international 
financial institutions and mainstream economists. 
The country has been repeatedly barraged with prophecies of its 
imminent failure. And yet it has managed—judging by many standard 
economic measures—to enjoy a significant degree of success. This has 
been a source of repeated puzzlement in orthodox circles. 
Emblematic is a 1999 IMF Staff Paper by J. Zettelmeyer (Vol. 46, #3), 
which noted that although Uzbekistan had a “hesitant and idiosyncratic 
approach to reforms”, it was still outperforming other countries of the 
former Soviet Union. The paper labeled this surprising result ‘the Uzbek 
growth puzzle’.
At the start of the transition, Uzbekistan suffered from several severe 
external shocks. Soviet subsidies, which had been 7-9% of Uzbekistan’s 
GDP in the late 1980s, were suddenly withdrawn. The country’s terms of 
trade plummeted after it could no longer import cheap Soviet oil and 
relatively inexpensive food. And at least 300,000 professionals, mostly 
Russians and Ukrainians, flooded out of the country.
Ignoring the IMF
In the early 1990s, the IMF had stepped in to offer the country its 
standard policy recommendations: quickly liberalise markets and 
prices, open up to external trade and finance, rapidly privatise, free the 
economy from state control and tighten fiscal and monetary policies. 
Instead, Uzbekistan opted for a more gradual transformation of its 
economy.
As a consequence, its GDP declined by only about 18% between 1991 
and 1995—a moderate reduction matched only by the richer transition 
economies of Central Europe. Moreover, government policies mitigated 
the impact of the economic downturn by instituting a decentralized 
form of social assistance, run by mahallas or community organizations, 
which targeted income subsidies to the poorer sections of the 
population.
Beginning in 1996—when many other transition economies were still 
struggling with recession—Uzbekistan’s economy began to grow, and 
it averaged rates of over 4% from 1997 onwards. By 2001, its GDP had 
recovered to 103% of its 1989 level, making it the first former Soviet 
Republic to regain its pre-transition level.
Early on, Uzbekistan also began to structurally transform its economy, 
adopting an import-substitution strategy and beginning to diversify 
out of its heavy reliance on cotton exports. The country is blessed with a 
range of abundant natural resources, i.e., gold, other valued metals 
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such as silver, copper and tungsten, and, most importantly, gas and oil 
reserves.
While Uzbekistan had imported 60% of its oil during the Soviet period, 
by 1995 it had become self-sufficient in oil production—without any 
foreign direct investment. By 1995, the country was also producing 3.2 
million tons of grain and by the 2000s was producing about 90% of its 
domestic needs.
The Crisis of the Late 1990s
By the mid 1990s, the government appeared to be moving closer to 
adopting IMF-supported liberalisation policies. But this honeymoon 
quickly soured when the economy was rocked by the 1996 cotton 
crisis. While cotton still accounted for about half of the country’s 
foreign-exchange earnings, its world price fell by 15% and the country’s 
production of it fell by a similar percentage. This crisis was compounded 
by the Russian financial crisis of 1998, when the sharp devaluation of the 
ruble dealt another severe blow to Uzbekistan’s exports.
In the wake of the cotton crisis, the government suspended its stand-
by loan with the IMF, and EBRD and World Bank loans subsequently 
dried up. The country was intent on pursuing more aggressively its 
previous strategy of import substitution, targeting credit to some of the 
more capital-intensive sectors of the economy, such as the oil and gas 
complex.
While the GDP growth rate continued to average about 4% during the 
early 2000s, it accelerated to over 7% by 2004 and exceeded 9% in 2007 
and 2008 (see Table). This growth was based on rapid expansion of 
industry and fueled by increases in exports of commodities such as gold 
and gas. Domestic capital investment increased by more than 25% by 
2007 and grew rapidly thereafter. 
Thus, Uzbekistan confronted the global food and fuel crisis of 2008 from 
a fairly strong position. For example, food as a share of total imports 
had fallen from 21.5% during 1995-99 to only about 9% during 2003-
2006. Meanwhile, machinery imports had grown to 47% of the total 
Source: State Statistics Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan. * 2009 is for January-June.
Key Macroeconomic Indicators (% change year on year)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009*
GDP 3.8 4.2 4.0 4.2 7.4 7.0 7.5 9.5 9.0 8.2
Industry 5.9 7.6 8.3 6.0 9.4 7.2 10.8 2.1 2.7 9.1
Agriculture 3.1 4.2 6.0 7.3 8.9 5.4 6.7 6.1 4.5 4.6
Exports 0.9 -2.9 -5.7 24.6 30.3 11.5 18.1 40.7 27.8 2.8
Capital 
Investment 1.0 4.0 3.6 4.8 7.3 5.7 9.3 25.8 28.3 32.7
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while energy imports remained low, at 4%. The structure of Uzbekistan’s 
exports and imports compared favourably to that of many other 
developing and emerging economies suffering at that time from sharply 
rising import prices (see McKinley and Weeks 2009).
During 2003-2006, Uzbekistan’s energy exports constituted about 14% 
of total exports and gold exports about 29%. The country’s cotton 
exports, as a share of the total, had fallen from about 42% to about 
21%. According to the IMF, the balance on Uzbekistan’s current account 
exceeded 9% of GDP in 2006 and shot up further to 12.8% of GDP by 
2008.
Confronting the Global Crisis
How has Uzbekistan been affected by the global crisis? The impact 
has not been severe. Its economy has not been afflicted by financial 
contagion since its financial liberalization has been limited. While noting 
that Uzbekistan grew by 9% in 2008, the IMF predicted last October 
that the country’s growth would drop to 7% in 2009. Still, it forecast that 
Uzbekistan would be one of the countries in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia region least affected by the global financial crisis. 
Because of projected declines in remittances and non-energy exports, 
Uzbekistan’s current-account surplus was forecast to drop from its 
peak of 12.8% of GDP in 2008 to a still credible 7.2% in 2009. The IMF 
noted that because Uzbekistan had ample foreign-exchange reserves, 
it would not likely face serious exchange-rate pressures. Moreover, its 
policymakers had mitigated the basis for sharp shocks to its currency’s 
value through a continuous process of ‘crawling peg devaluations’. 
Government economic data through the first six months of 2009 show 
that Uzbekistan’s GDP was growing at a rate of 8.2%, compared to the 
same period in 2008 (see Table). The country’s industrial output was 
growing reasonably well, at a 9.1% rate, although its agricultural output 
increased more slowly, at a 4.6% rate. 
The growth of Uzbekistan’s exports suffered a sharp drop, from a rate 
of 27.8% in 2008 (year on year) to only 2.8% during the first six months 
of 2009. While there were reductions in exports across a broad range of 
sectors, including cotton, chemical products, metals, and machinery and
equipment, these declines were offset, to some degree, by Uzbekistan’s 
exports of energy and oil products, which grew by a very high 240% rate. 
The drop in Uzbekistan’s non-energy exports during early 2009 would 
have taken a noticeable toll on its economy had the Government’s 
new Anti-Crisis Programme not initiated a large counter-cyclical fiscal 
stimulus, equivalent to about 5% of GDP. Similar to China’s stimulus, this 
programme imparted a sizeable boost to investment in fixed capital. Both 
public and private investment grew by 32.7% in early 2009, and helped 
stimulate a 32.5% growth rate in the construction sector.
It is noteworthy that Uzbekistan has had the ‘fiscal space’ to finance an 
ambitious investment programme, which has helped counteract any 
current slowdown and will likely support faster future economic growth. 
Unlike many other low-income economies, Uzbekistan has been able 
to mobilise total revenue of over 30% of GDP. During the 2000s, its 
consolidated government budget remained roughly in balance, while it 
began to recently channel its current-account surpluses into a new Fund 
for Reconstruction and Development.
In Conclusion
In general, Uzbekistan’s heterodox policies have served it fairly well. It 
was able to successfully moderate the hardships of its early transition, 
resume credible rates of economic growth by the late 1990s, and 
substantially restructure its economy to be more self-sufficient in such 
critical items as energy and food. 
Its restructuring has enabled it to avoid some of the worst effects of 
the food and fuel crisis of mid-1998 and the global financial crisis and 
recession of 1998-1999. Aspects of Uzbekistan’s development model 
could certainly be criticized (see McKinley and Weeks 2009). Employment 
growth has consistently lagged behind economic growth and poverty 
reduction has been slow.
Yet by any standard barometers of economic performance—as well as 
by comparison with other low-income countries—Uzbekistan has been 
relatively successful over two decades of transition and development, 
though its achievements appear to remain a frustrating puzzle to many 
orthodox economists.
This recent book provides a 
comprehensive set of recommen-
dations for alternative economic 
policies that can generate growth, 
employment and poverty reduc-
tion in developing countries: 
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